読まなきゃリスト

Gamba, Andrea and Tesser, Matteo, Structural estimation of real options models, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, forthcoming.

Peters, Michael and Severinov, Sergei, Internet auctions with many traders, Journal of Economic Theory 130, pp. 220-245, 2006.

Plott, Chales, R. and Glay, Peter, The multiple unit double auction, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 13, pp. 245-258, 1990.

Moulin, Hervé, Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects, Journal of Economic Theory 144, pp. 96-119, 2009.

Yoon, Kiho, The Modified Vickrey Double Auction, Journal of Economic Theory 101, 572-584, 2001.

Yoon, Kiho, The participatory Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism, Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, pp. 324–336, 2008.

Bikhchandani, S., de Vries, S., Schummer, J. and Vohra, R. V., Linear Programming
and Vickrey Auctions, in Dietrich, B. and Vohra, Rakesh V. (eds.) Mathematics of the Internet: E-Auction and Markets, Springer, 2001.

Parkes, D. C. and Ungar, L., Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and
Practice, Proceedings 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 74-81, 2000.

Brewer, Paul J., Decentralized computation procurement and computational robustness in a smart market, Economic Theory 13, 41-92, 1999.

Wellman, Michael, P., Walsh, William, E., Wurman, Peter, R., MacKie-Mason, Jafferey, K., Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling, Games and Economic Behavior 35, pp. 271-303, 2001.

Kutanoglu, Erhan and Wu, David, S., On combinatorial auction and Lagrangean relaxation for distributed resource scheduling, IIE Transactions 31, pp. 813-826, 1999.